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During the second half of the twentieth century, many countries 
fundamentally altered the way in which their legal systems addressed 
 
* Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California, Irvine; 
M.A., Climate and Society, Columbia University; M.A., Political Science, University of 
California, Irvine; B.A., Political Science, University of Florida, magna cum laude, 
valedictorian, and Marshall Scholarship finalist. Josh has served as a researcher for the 
Global Roundtable on Climate Change and the Center for Research on Environmental 
Decisions. He has presented research on climate change, environmental law, and 
environmental ethics at many conferences, including the American Political Science 
Association and International Studies Association annual meetings. He is a member of the 
University of California, Irvine Environment Institute’s 2011 Sustainability Science 
Team. 
GELLERS 1/10/2012  9:12 AM 
462 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 26, 461 
environmental issues. In particular, legal innovations were developed 
to offer citizens a means of redressing grievances against the state or 
private entities for violating environmental regulations. The United 
States began expanding access to its courts for environmental 
litigation through a landmark decision that broadened the concept of 
standing;1 India enlarged the field of potential claimants in 
environmental litigation through a landmark decision and innovative 
constitutional interpretation; Japan sought to provide avenues for 
obtaining remedies through national environmental legislation, but 
grievances have been more successfully redressed through major 
decisions that have expanded the scope of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. Despite differences in governmental structure, legal doctrine, 
and legislation, states have undergone dramatic transformations in the 
way that the public interfaces with the legal system in order to right 
environmental wrongs. 
How might social scientists explain this convergence around the 
notion of public empowerment and enhanced access to courts in order 
to redress environmental grievances? This Article seeks to develop a 
response to this line of inquiry by tracing the evolution of judicial 
innovations in environmental litigation in the United States, India, 
and Japan. 
In this Article, I evaluate the explanatory capabilities of two groups 
of theories—law and globalization, and policy diffusion and transfer.  
Then I provide in depth analysis of the development of environmental 
law in three countries—the United States, India, and Japan—in order 
to decipher the main causal factors contributing to changes in the way 
each country approaches access to courts for the purpose of redressing 
environmental grievances. I find that neither theories of law and 
globalization nor theories of policy transfer and diffusion offer much 
value in explaining the changes that occurred. In addition, I find that 
while the mechanisms countries utilize to expand access to courts for 
individuals to engage in environmental litigation are context-specific, 
countries have similarly endeavored to challenge the conventional 
interpretations of legal doctrine in order to have environmental 
wrongs addressed by the courts. Finally, I conclude by arguing that 
this trend may be indicative of an emerging international norm 
 
1 Also referred to as locus standi, standing refers to “the personal stake that a party has 
in the matter before the court.” Hudson P. Henry, Constitutional Law Standing, A Shift in 
Citizen Suit Standing Doctrine: Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 234–35 (2001). 
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whereby individuals may have legitimate legal claims when they 
suffer (or may potentially suffer) from man-made environmental 
damage, and that individuals possess certain environmental rights 
which, when infringed upon, give rise to legal claims that require 
adjudication by courts. 
I 
OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT THEORIES 
Two potential theoretical explanations concerning the approximate 
convergence of legal systems over the issue of environmental rights 
will be discussed here—theories of law and globalization and theories 
of policy transfer and diffusion. 
A.  Theories of Law and Globalization 
Theories relating to law and globalization offer one perspective 
that may be useful in understanding the changes in legal norms 
documented here. Legal scholars, political scientists, and sociologists 
alike have attempted to locate the sources of legal norm change 
within a state by examining how international norms, or norms 
external to the state, facilitate shifts in domestic judicial practices. 
These mechanisms have been characterized in various ways: 
transnational legal process,2 judicial globalization,3 globalization of 
law,4 recursivity of law,5 and norm life cycle.6 These theories are 
described in greater detail below. 
Transnational legal process offers one way to explain dynamic 
global conversations pertaining to law: “Transnational legal process 
describes the theory and practice of how public and private actors . . . 
interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international 
fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of 
transnational law.”7 Four attributes define this theory: (1) 
transnational legal process is nontraditional in that it diverges from 
 
2 Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process, 
75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). 
3 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2000). 
4 Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993). 
5 Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm 
Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 
112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007). 
6 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998). 
7 Koh, supra note 2, at 183–84. 
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traditional scholarship on international law by breaking down the 
dichotomy between domestic and international legal spheres; (2) the 
theory is nonstatist because agency is afforded to nonstate actors in 
addition to states; (3) transnational legal process is a theory marked 
by dynamic interactions among nonstate actors and states, between 
states, and between public life and the private sphere;8 and, (4) 
transnational legal process is normative.9 That is, norms are created, 
“interpreted, internalized, and enforced, thus beginning the process all 
over again.”10 
In a second theoretical approach, the mechanisms through which 
legal norms are internationalized function as a process referred to as 
“judicial globalization.”11 This process is conducted primarily by 
judges who communicate, exchange ideas, and cooperate on various 
legal issues. Transjudicial communication can take several forms: 
vertical communication (i.e., relations between federal and 
supranational courts), horizontal communication12 (i.e., relations 
between national judicial systems at the interstate level), and mixed 
vertical-horizontal communication (i.e., supranational courts 
functioning as channels for exchange among states or clarifying 
common legal principles shared among states).13 Transjudicial 
communication may be further categorized according to the degree of 
reciprocal engagement offered by one legal system to another. In 
direct dialogue, one court initiates communication and another court 
responds.14 This form of transjudicial dialogue indicates a situation in 
which both parties to the conversation are cognizant of the 
communication and willing to participate in a reciprocal fashion. In 
monologue, one court conducts its business without considering itself 
part of a continuous conversation among courts.15 In intermediated 
dialogue, a supranational court mediates between the courts of 
individual states. 
 
8 For example, norms can originate at any level of governance and impact the 
functioning of any level in the international system. 
9 Koh, supra note 2, at 184. 
10 Id. 
11 Slaughter, supra note 3, at 1104. 
12 Horizontal judicial globalization is further broken down into two types: (1) “judicial 
cooperation in resolving transnational disputes” and (2) “cross-fertilization of national 
judicial decisions.” Id. at 1112. 
13 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 99, 103–12 (1994). 
14 Id. at 112. 
15 Id. at 113. 
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A third theory that may prove informative is the theory of the 
globalization of law, which cautions scholars to recognize the limited 
extent to which certain areas of law have penetrated globally. This 
theory advances the idea that when speaking of the globalization of 
law, the effects and influences recognized are actually restricted to 
only a small number of countries.16 Further, “globalization of law” 
may be an exaggeration of reality; a more appropriate description of 
the phenomenon observed may be that while globalization will place 
new but similar demands on certain states, state responses will be 
based on domestic concerns as opposed to exclusively international 
legal norms.17 In the case of the United States, the influence of legal 
changes will flow out to willing recipient countries, but the United 
States will remain fairly insulated from the incorporation of foreign 
legal innovations. Shapiro asserts that the globalization of law is in 
essence a reified globalized Americanism.18 
A fourth theoretical orientation presents a sociological treatment of 
the globalization of law termed the “recursivity of law.”19 Advocates 
of this theory claim to fill a critical gap in the literature on 
globalization and its effects on law by emphasizing the dynamic and 
inclusive aspects of legal globalization. The recursivity of law 
features four factors that distinguish it from other sociological 
approaches to the study of law. 
First, the recursivity of law perspective highlights the role played 
by legal actors such as lawyers, judges, and legal scholars.20 Second, 
the theory “pays close attention to the constitutive power of legal 
concepts.”21 More precisely, recursivity adopts a constructivist 
approach to law whereby codified rules shape the legal environment 
in which actors exist, while the actors themselves internalize the rules 
and adapt them to their current circumstances. Third, the recursivity 
of law recognizes the independent capacity of legal institutions to 
constrain actors and shape legal rules.22 Finally, the theory examines 
how the form that law takes (i.e., case law, codes, regulatory 
 
16 More specifically, the phenomenon of the globalization of law is in reality confined 
largely to the United States and “Western Europe with shadowy addenda.” Shapiro, supra 
note 4, at 38. 
17 Id. at 63. 
18 Id. at 39. 
19 Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 5, at 1138. 
20 Id. at 1142. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1142–43. 
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standards) “affects its implementation, its comprehension, its agents, 
and its function.”23 The recursivity of law approach also presents four 
mechanisms that describe the intrinsic tensions experienced by states 
acting within the global legal arena: the indeterminacy of law, 
contradictions, diagnostic struggles, and actor mismatch.24 
Finally, a “norm life cycle” approach provides an international 
relations theory-based alternative to the legalistic approaches detailed 
earlier in this part.25 This alternative perspective offers an explanation 
of how norms influence state behavior through a three-stage process: 
(1) norm emergence, (2) norm cascade, and (3) norm internalization.26 
In the first stage, proponents of a specific norm, or norm 
entrepreneurs, seek to persuade relevant actors to adopt the norm. 
Between the first stage and the second stage a tipping point is reached 
when a “critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm.”27 This 
in turn leads to the second stage, when other actors imitate the norm 
and the norm achieves broad acceptance. Finally, during the third 
stage of the life cycle, debate over the norm ceases and the norm 
becomes embedded in practice. 
Each of the approaches enumerated above seeks to develop a 
theoretical explanation for changes in domestic legal structures that 
can be understood in terms of the larger global legal environment in 
which states exist. Some theories purport a great deal of fluidity 
between the active agency of domestic and international actors (i.e., 
transnational legal process, judicial globalization, recursivity of law, 
and norm life cycle), while other theories restrict the phenomenon to 
relatively static geographic parameters (i.e., globalization of law). The 
theories summarized above also vary in terms of the agency afforded 
to various actors. On one side of the spectrum lie those theories that 
focus primarily on the role of states (i.e., globalization of law and 
transnational legal process). On the other side of the spectrum reside 
theories that recognize a variety of actors that can impact the 
international legal environment (i.e., recursivity of law, judicial 
globalization, and norm life cycle). Finally, each of the theories 
recognizes the significant interplay that occurs between actors at all 
levels of international society. This dynamism runs along a continuum 
 
23 Id. at 1143. 
24 Id. at 1149–52. 
25 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 6, at 895–96. 
26 Id. at 895. 
27 Id. 
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with conceptions of interactivity among relevant actors (i.e., states, 
judges, courts, legal scholars, nonstate actors, etc.) ranging from the 
inegalitarian, nonreciprocal influence suggested by the globalization 
of law (i.e., the role of the U.S. Supreme Court within the larger 
community of courts) to the complete reciprocal engagement and co-
constitution explicated in the recursivity of law and norm life cycle 
(i.e., courts engaged in direct dialogue with one another). These 
theories have been articulated in various forms, but essentially all of 
the permutations seek to explain legal norm change in terms of the 
process by which legal decisions and scholarship from one state 
influence the actions and outcomes of another state’s legal system. 
B.  Theories of Policy Transfer and Diffusion 
Theories regarding policy transfer and diffusion present another 
possible source of explanatory value for the phenomenon observed. 
Policy transfer refers to “the process by which knowledge about 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one 
political system (past or present) is used in the development of 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, and ideas in 
another political system.”28 Policy transfer in particular is concerned 
with understanding who is responsible (i.e., policymakers) for 
transferring what forms of information to what ends and deciphering 
whether the transfer is successful or not.29 Within the context of this 
paper, policy transfer may be useful in attempting to explain a certain 
outcome—such as increased access to courts in order to redress 
environmental grievances—because it seeks to answer “the very basic 
questions of who, what, why, where and how policy transfer takes 
place.”30 
Related to policy transfer is the concept of policy diffusion. Policy 
diffusion refers to understanding the mechanisms by which 
“innovations, policies, or programs spread from one governmental 
 
28 David P. Dolowitz & David Marsh, Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy 
Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making, 13 GOVERNANCE 5, 5 (2000). 
29  For the purposes of this Article, law may be considered a form of policy (i.e., as a 
policy instrument) and judges act as policymakers despite their omission from the list of 
common actors in the policy transfer process. Id. at 10. 
30 Edward C. Page, Future Governance and the Literature on Policy Transfer and 
Lesson Drawing, ESRC FUTURE GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME WORKSHOP PAPER, London, 
Jan. 28, 2000, at 3. 
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entity to another.”31 Unlike policy transfer, however, policy diffusion 
casts a broader conceptual net: “policy diffusion is not restricted to 
the operation of specific mediation mechanisms, but includes all 
conceivable channels of influence between countries.”32 Perhaps more 
importantly, policy diffusion differs from policy transfer in that it is 
often used to describe structural reasons for patterns of policy 
adoption as opposed to explaining the adoption of policy in a 
particularized circumstance.33 Yet when considered in tandem, policy 
transfer and policy diffusion offer a pair of theoretical concepts that 
may prove useful in the present study as they both “reflect processes 
which under certain circumstances might result in policy 
convergence.”34 
Whereas theories of law and globalization function explicitly to 
explain changes occurring in the legal domain, theories of policy 
transfer and diffusion seek to describe the process by which changes 
happen in a substantive policy area. Yet both sets of theories 
emphasize the role of globalization in facilitating the movement and 
subsequent utilization of ideas that originated elsewhere.35 Also, 
while distinct differences between the groups of theories exist, there 
are also important overlaps in conceptual orientation. For instance, 
Slaughter’s typology of transjudicial communication could easily be 
subsumed by the theory of policy diffusion due to its concentration on 
a subset of actors (i.e., judges) that fall under the purview of 
organizational studies, an antecedent of diffusion studies. Both 
theories involving law and globalization and theories of policy 
transfer and diffusion present useful ways of thinking about the 
processes by which similar changes occur across legal systems. 
The next three parts provide detailed descriptions and analyses of 
the paths taken by the United States, India, and Japan to expand 
access to courts in order for individuals and groups to have their 
grievances for environmental wrongs redressed. Due to the vast 
differences between the cases in terms of geography, stage of 
 
31 Adam J. Newmark, An Integrated Approach to Policy Transfer and Diffusion, 19 
REV. POL’Y RES. 151, 152 (2002). 
32 Christoph Knill, Introduction: Cross-National Policy Convergence: Concepts, 
Approaches and Explanatory Factors, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 764, 766 (2005). 
33 See, e.g., Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism 
in Latin America: Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of a New Order, 598 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 102 (2005). 
34 Knill, supra note 32, at 767. 
35 See Dolowitz & Marsh, supra note 28; Slaughter, supra note 3. 
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economic development, political history, and effectiveness of 
institutions, it stands to reason that the United States will prove to 
have served as a policy entrepreneur, informing the later policy and 
legal decisions made in India and Japan. Yet the mechanisms by 
which such influence is conveyed remain to be seen. Duly recognized 
is the fact that the preceding statement presumes some modicum of 
information sharing and conscious adoption of innovative policy. It 
may, in fact, be the case that the influence of the United States in this 
domain of policy was marginal at best. Such a finding would indeed 
require subsequent iterations of theorizing and hypothesis testing. 
II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STANDING DOCTRINE 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The conception of legal standing as it is used in modern American 
jurisprudence has departed significantly from its colonial roots. 
Indeed, “‘standing’ was neither a term of art nor a familiar doctrine at 
the time the Constitution was adopted.”36 During the founding of the 
United States, the Framers drew insight from English law. English 
law articulated, at least as early as 1724,37 the idea that a stranger 
possesses the ability to bring a cause of action where abuses of 
judicial authority are concerned without being required to show that 
such abuses resulted in specific injury. Colonial courts, which often 
deferred in the nascent stages of the American legal system to English 
doctrine and precedent, similarly permitted third parties who did not 
demonstrate a concrete injury-in-fact to resolve disputes in court.38 In 
fact, “[n]either English nor colonial courts applied any jurisdictional 
limit that bore any resemblance to the modern law of standing.”39 
Therefore, American judicial records dating back to the judiciary’s 
founding exhibit a liberal interpretation of standing doctrine, a 
construal that reflects the influence of English practice on early 
colonial jurisprudence. 
 
36 Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 
78 YALE L.J. 816, 818 (1969). 
37 Arthur v. Comm’rs of Sewers in Yorkshire, 88 Eng. Rep. 237 (1725). 
38 Berger, supra note 36; see also Matt Handley, Why Crocodiles, Elephants, and 
American Citizens Should Prefer Foreign Courts: A Comparative Analysis of Standing to 
Sue, 21 REV. LITIG. 97, 103 (2002). 
39 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1764 
(1998). 
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The practice of awarding standing even where a claimant does not 
possess a direct interest in the matter or has not demonstrated specific 
injury remained unperturbed for decades. However, in the early 
nineteenth century, challenges to standing doctrine emerged. Yet it 
would not be until 1897 that the standing of an individual in a case 
involving a public right would be contested in an American court.40 
Standing would later formally enter the legal system as a critical issue 
in the 1923 case Frothingham v. Mellon.41 Frothingham rendered 
ambiguous whether courts were to approach standing as a 
constitutional mandate or common law doctrine.42 This quandary was 
first entertained in Stark v. Wickard in 1944,43 which yielded the first 
federal judicial opinion on the matter. In Stark, the Court determined 
that Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which outlines those “cases” 
and “controversies”44 that may fall within the power of the judiciary, 
should be interpreted in a more restrictive fashion.45 This decision had 
the effect of narrowing the criteria used to decipher whether the 
plaintiff could prove he or she had been injured by the actions of the 
defendant.46 In its 1970 decision, Ass’n of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, the Court clarified its assertion in Stark 
by recognizing injury-in-fact as a necessary condition for the 
attainment of standing under Article III.47 The decision in Data 
Processing also required plaintiffs to prove that “the interest sought to 
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of 
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question.”48 Two additional Article III requirements were 
introduced by the Court in 1973,49 and standing doctrine formally 
expanded to a three-prong test in 1976,50 requiring that a plaintiff 
demonstrate (1) injury-in-fact; (2) that the injury can be traced to the 
 
40 Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. 
REV. 1265, 1271–72 (1961). 
41 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
42 Id. 
43 Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944). 
44 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
45 Stark, 321 U.S. at 310. 
46 Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169 (1992); see also Handley, supra note 38, at 104–05; 
Pierce, supra note 39, at 1765. 
47 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
48 Id. at 153. 
49 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973). 
50 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
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actions of the defendant; and (3) that a decision in favor of the 
plaintiff is likely to redress the injury sustained.51 
Standing doctrine in the United States has had a major impact on 
the opportunities available for private citizens and environmental 
organizations to engage in litigation on the basis of representing the 
public interest in environmental protection. Four watershed cases 
discussed below serve to illustrate the role played by nonlinear 
changes in standing in the development of American public interest 
environmental law. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. 
Federal Power Commission, a federal court addressed the issue of 
whether an environmental group could satisfy the requirements to 
obtain standing.52 In Scenic Hudson, citizens assembled under the 
group name Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference filed an 
injunction against the Federal Power Commission to enjoin the 
agency’s plans to build a hydroelectric power plant in Cornwall, New 
York.53 The citizens’ group alleged that the planned power plant 
would diminish the area’s recreational, aesthetic, and biological 
quality.54 Under the Federal Power Act, the Federal Power 
Commission was required “to promote the most efficient use of water 
resources, including recreational use.”55 Recognizing the potential 
harm to the concerned citizens posed by the construction of the power 
plant and the federal mandate to protect recreational use of water 
resources, the court ruled that the rights of the group had been 
infringed upon.56 Thus, the court determined that the Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference did, in fact, satisfy the standing criteria of 
“injury-in-fact,” and, ultimately, that the Federal Power Commission 
did not adequately conduct its due diligence with regard to assessing 
the impacts that the proposed hydroelectric power plant would have 
on the citizens of Cornwall.57 The case marked the first time in 
 
51 Pierce, supra note 39, at 1765; see also Laveta Casdorph, The Constitution and 
Reconstitution of the Standing Doctrine, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 471, 498–99 (1999). 
52 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). 
53 JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 11 (2d ed. 2007). 
54 Id. 
55 Lucien Chipley, Comment, Environmental Law—Standing to Sue, 6 LAND & WATER 
L. REV. 527, 530 (1970–71). 
56 Id. 
57 SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 53, at 11. 
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American legal history that an environmental group was granted 
standing in a court of law.58 
Almost thirty years later, the Supreme Court would be forced to 
further explicate the injury-in-fact requirement as it applied to public 
interest environmental law in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.59 In 
Lujan, a group of plaintiffs filed suit against the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, alleging that the agency’s practice of “funding . . . overseas 
projects that threatened endangered species in Egypt and Sri Lanka” 
violated the terms of the Endangered Species Act.60 The plaintiffs’ 
standing argument was based on the notion that two individuals 
affiliated with Defenders of Wildlife had once visited the foreign 
natural habitats of endangered animals and intended to return at some 
point in the unspecified future.61 The Court did not find this argument 
persuasive, asserting that the plaintiffs’ intentions to return to the 
habitats abroad were not sufficient to fulfill the injury-in-fact 
requirement of the three-prong standing test and that the alleged 
injury-in-fact must be “concrete and particularized” as well as “actual 
or imminent.”62 In sum, the Court’s decision in Lujan effectively 
narrowed the circumstances under which a plaintiff can claim an 
injury-in-fact, constricting the potential for a claimant to attain 
standing in the realm of environmental law. 
The scope of what constitutes an injury-in-fact would again be 
tapered in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment.63 In Steel 
Co., “the Court applied a narrow interpretation of the redressability 
requirement to deny standing to a nonprofit citizens group suing 
under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA) for a manufacturing company’s failure to make available 
required reports concerning toxic chemical use.”64 In particular, 
redressability was denied on the grounds that because Steel Co. had 
begun to comply with the report requests before the trial commenced, 
 
58 The case was subsequently remanded and in 1971 the Federal Power Commission 
was deemed to have satisfactorily evaluated the environmental impacts of constructing a 
hydroelectric power plant along the Hudson River. Scenic Hudson Press Conference v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 453 F.2d 463, 481 (2nd Cir. 1971). 
59 See 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
60 Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental 
Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 52–53 (Fall 2001). 
61 Sunstein, supra note 46, at 198. 
62 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 564. 
63 See 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
64 Henry, supra note 1, at 238. 
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civil penalties paid by the company would not have the restorative 
effect on the alleged grievance mandated by the current standing 
doctrine.65 This strict temporal consideration of redressability marked 
a setback for potential environmental litigants clamoring to enforce 
compliance with environmental statutes through the judicial system. It 
allowed companies to “minimize the times they have to report [on the 
use of toxic chemicals] and always avoid being sued by merely 
beginning to report after being threatened with a lawsuit.”66 In effect, 
the decision in Steel Co. reduced the incentive for companies to 
comply initially with environmental regulations and allotted them 
additional time to violate federal environmental statutes before legal 
action is instigated by environmental groups. 
More recently, the Supreme Court revisited the requirements for 
standing in environmental law in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services, Inc.67 The case involved a group of 
environmentalists who filed suit against Laidlaw under the citizen suit 
provision of the Clean Water Act for allegedly violating the 
conditions of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit the company had successfully obtained from the 
South Carolina Department of Health and the Environment (DHEC).68 
After a series of appeals from both sides, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and considered whether the plaintiffs, Friends of the Earth 
(FOE), satisfied the requirements necessary to attain standing and 
bring suit against Laidlaw.69 In particular, the Court examined 
whether the plaintiffs were able to demonstrate injury-in-fact in light 
of the dearth of evidence indicating that Laidlaw’s actions had 
diminished the water quality of the North Tyger River.70 The Court 
ultimately decided in favor of FOE by a seven to two margin, holding 
“that the lessening of aesthetic and recreational values of an area can 
constitute a valid injury-in-fact for Article III purposes and . . . that 
FOE’s members had suffered a sufficiently concrete injury-in-fact.”71 
The decision rendered in the Laidlaw case offers two important 
implications for standing doctrine in American environmental law. 
First, unlike Steel Co. where the alleged violations all occurred in the 
 
65 Id. 
66 Handley, supra note 38, at 113. 
67 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
68 Henry, supra note 1, at 242–43. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 243–44. 
71 Id. 
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past, Laidlaw dealt with violations that were alleged to continue up 
until the time that the case was heard in the appellate court. The ruling 
in Laidlaw signaled the Court’s relaxation of the redressability prong 
as conceived in Steel Co., asserting that civil penalties could perform 
a restorative function as a deterrent against continued harmful 
activities. Second, Laidlaw expanded injury-in-fact to include affronts 
to a plaintiff’s aesthetic and recreational values. As a result, the Court 
retreated from the requirement set forth in Lujan that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate imminent and particularized injury to satisfy the injury-
in-fact prong of standing doctrine. Courts would not require that a 
claimant pursuing legal action against a party accused of violating 
environmental regulations prove scientifically or through quantitative 
analysis the existence of a harm to the environment. Less readily 
quantified infringements of aesthetic or recreational value would 
suffice to justify bringing a cause of action. 
Since the 1940s, standing doctrine in the United States has 
gradually evolved to require the fulfillment of more stringent criteria 
under the auspices of an increasingly broad interpretation of Article 
III “cases” and “controversies.” The development of modern 
American standing rules can be understood in terms of three periods 
of judicial innovation—a conservative period (1930s and 1940s) in 
which the Court sought to “protect New Deal legislation from court-
based attacks by businesses seeking to preserve their economic 
interests”; a liberal period (1960s and 1970s) marked by a relaxation 
in standing rules in response to the expansion of individual 
constitutional rights; and a more recent conservative period (1980s 
onward) in which the appointment of new justices during three 
Republican administrations has resulted in a narrowed interpretation 
of standing.72 
Since the 1940s, standing as applied to environmental law has 
varied considerably more than standing doctrine overall. As intimated 
above, the incongruous trajectories of standing doctrine and standing 
rules in public interest environmental law may be due to the 
interaction of two factors—the ideological dispositions of judges and 
periods of fundamental social, economic, and political change in the 
United States. Isolating the individual impact of either variable 
represents a Herculean task. On the one hand, judges’ ideological 
stances are consistent and transparent enough to predict the rate at 
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which a judge will grant standing to certain types of plaintiffs.73 On 
the other hand, a shift in social attitudes toward the environment may 
have spurred judicial activism, which permitted the public greater 
access to the courts to redress environmental grievances.74 However, 
it may also be that an individual judge’s ideology and the changing 
context in which judicial decisions were made were simply two 
elements of a co-constitutive relationship.75 
The remainder of this paper focuses on two additional cases—India 
and Japan. The case in India centers on the development of locus 
standi in public interest litigation. The case in Japan concerns the role 
of government and the legal system in addressing pollution and its 
impacts on human health. The goal of the following historical 
analyses is to assess how, in each case, the legal system evolved to 
serve the interests of the citizens who sought to obtain remedies for 
environmental harms that were committed by public or private 
entities. 
III 
THE REVOLUTION OF LOCUS STANDI IN INDIAN PUBLIC INTEREST 
LITIGATION 
Unlike other developing countries with underdeveloped judicial 
systems, India possesses a progressive history of expanding public 
interest litigation and incorporating facets of international 
environmental law into its legal doctrine.76 However, India’s path to 
adopting a liberal perspective on judicial standing has been a 
tumultuous one. The end of World War I launched national and social 
revolutions in India. Following the conclusion of World War II, 
India’s concurrent revolutions provided the political will necessary to 
demand freedom from British colonialism. After years of colonial 
subjugation, India gained its independence on August 15, 1947. In an 
effort to realize the dream of social equality, which was stifled under 
British rule, the Constitution of India (1949) was designed to address 
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issues of social justice and promote equal treatment under the law. 
Such desires required a strong judicial branch to enforce the laws. 
The judiciary’s role as guarantor of social justice would not be 
developed swiftly, however. The judiciary’s emergence as a reliable 
protector of individual rights would be contingent upon its ability to 
cast off the oppressive shackles of its colonial history. For some 
scholars, optimism about the role of the courts in India abounds: “The 
judiciary has a colonial past and the democratic destiny.”77 Such 
optimism is not rooted in unqualified idealism; indeed, the gradual 
relaxation of standing rules in India speaks to the country’s proactive 
stance on extending the concept of social justice to all Indians. 
Prior to the 1970s, and absent any formal rules for establishing 
standing provided by the Constitution, Indian courts relied on a 
“person aggrieved” standard for deciding who is fit to bring a case to 
trial.78 But beginning in the [1970s], standing rules in India were 
greatly expanded. Indian courts began to adopt a more flexible 
standard whereby those seeking access to the judicial system needed 
only to prove that they possessed “sufficient interest.”79 The 
expansion of judicial standing was fostered by two factors: (1) an 
increasing demand within India to address issues of social justice and 
(2) the insertion of a provision within the 42nd Amendment to the 
Indian Constitution that provided free legal aid to the poor.80 Both of 
these legal innovations were strongly advocated for by two activist 
judges sitting on the Supreme Court of India at the time, Justice 
Bhagwati and Justice Iyer.81 
A pivotal moment for the evolution of locus standi in Indian 
jurisprudence came in 1982 when the Supreme Court of India decided 
Judges’ Transfer Case, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149. In Judges’ Transfer 
Case, “[t]he Supreme Court ruled that bar associations of lawyers had 
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the right to sue against transfers of judges during the ‘Emergency’ 
that had been declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi—even 
though none of the lawyers would actually suffer economic harm 
from loss of clients by having different judges hear their cases than 
those originally assigned to a given court.”82 The result of this 
decision was a major broadening of locus standi, the circumstances 
under which marginalized groups could gain access to the courts in 
order to redress their grievances. The ruling established that “the use 
of law to bring about major changes in society requires that suits 
should not be limited to those where the rights of a specified 
individual or identifiable group can be said to have been infringed.”83 
With the requirements for obtaining standing relaxed, the Supreme 
Court experienced a tidal wave of “letters and petitions from poor 
aggrieved person[s], social workers and media-men complaining of 
injustice and seeking its interference.”84 
The decision in Judges’ Transfer Case not only “[expanded] the 
concept of justiciable public interest and prescrib[ed] an activist role 
for the judiciary in securing justice for the nation’s voiceless,”85 it 
also established the doctrinal framework known as representative 
standing. “Representative standing can be seen as a creative 
expansion of the well-accepted standing exception which allows a 
third party to file a habeas corpus petition on the ground that the 
injured party . . . cannot approach the court himself.”86 The doctrine 
of representative standing constituted a revolutionary legal innovation 
the likes of which had not been matched in ambition or scale by the 
courts in the United States or the United Kingdom.87 
A.  The Development of Environmental Rights in India 
Environmental rights in India have their origin in ancient religious 
scriptures. The scriptures ordained “it was the dharma of each 
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individual in society to protect Nature, so much so that people 
worshipped the objects of Nature.”88 Individual accountability was 
deemed necessary to ensure the sanctity of the entire community. This 
perspective is considered a precursor to the notion of “sustainable 
development.”89 
The modern bases upon which environmental rights in India are 
founded reside in the “concepts of ‘nuisance’ under tort law and 
‘public nuisance’ under criminal law.”90 Nuisance provides a legal 
foundation for environmental law in other common law countries as 
well, such as the United States.91 Public nuisance in particular has 
been utilized by Indian courts to determine that “[p]ublic health 
cannot be jeopardized by private business.”92 However, during the 
1970s, India’s environmental law would begin a dramatic shift from 
the principles of nuisance and public nuisance to human rights. In 
1975, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi issued a Proclamation of 
Emergency due to “‘internal disturbance[s]’ threatening the security 
of India.”93 Gandhi’s Emergency greatly limited civil and political 
rights in India. But by early 1977, Prime Minister Gandhi was ousted 
from office through state election and the Emergency was repealed. 
As the Indian people were still reeling from a period of civil unrest 
under Gandhi, the Supreme Court took it upon itself to redress the 
grievances of its constituents that it had failed to address during the 
Emergency by strengthening human rights protections. For example, 
the expansion of locus standi occurred in the wake of these events. 
Although progress on the environmental rights front had been 
realized toward the end of the 1970s, the 1980s brought a threshold 
event that drew attention to the major flaws in Indian environmental 
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law. In 1984, a pesticide factory in Bhopal leaked, killing thousands 
of Indians and injuring thousands more. This shocking environmental 
disaster “spurred the Central Government and a few state 
governments to adopt stronger environmental policies, to enact fresh 
legislation and to create, reorganize and expand administrative 
agencies.”94 Later, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Indian 
Supreme Court sought to enhance Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution through several landmark court decisions.95 Article 21 
reads: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty 
except according to procedure established by law.”96 In particular, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the fundamental right to life guaranteed in 
the Constitution to extend to “[t]he right to a ‘wholesome 
environment.’”97 The Court’s judgment in Subhashkumar v. State of 
Bihar, for instance, “held that the right to life includes the right to 
enjoy unpolluted air and water.”98 
The lessons learned from the Emergency under Gandhi and the 
Bhopal disaster have thus been addressed by both courts and 
governments at the federal and state levels. These watershed events 
have unambiguously shaped the landscape of environmental rights in 
India. 
B.  Synthesis 
While developments in American or English jurisprudence may 
have impacted the decision-making processes of Indian jurists, three 
additional explanations for the unique trajectory of Indian public 
interest environmental litigation are also plausible. First, activist 
judges such as Bhagwati served as norm entrepreneurs, at times 
venturing “far beyond the necessities of the particular case.”99 
Second, India’s Eastern philosophical roots predisposed the state and 
its judicial system to advanced legal reasoning regarding issues of 
human rights and the environment. Third, certain threshold events 
such as the Gandhi Emergency and the Bhopal disaster pushed the 
issue of human rights and environmental law to the extent that public 
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pressure mandated some form of judicial action. Indeed, major 
elements of the legal innovation of locus standi were most 
significantly affected by both the judicial activism of certain judges 
on the Indian Supreme Court and endogenous shocks to the state that 
heightened the salience of environmental issues. The evidence 
presented here suggests that the lowering of standing rules in India 
was philosophically grounded in American and English legal thought, 
but more decisively impacted by highly salient events and norm 
entrepreneurship. 
IV 
A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN 
Japan’s struggle to address environmental issues can be segmented 
into four historical periods: (1) the period comprised of all history up 
until World War II; (2) the period from the start of World War II 
through 1967; (3) the period from 1967 until 1975; and (4) the post-
1975 state of affairs.100 For the purposes of the current study, only the 
first three periods will be covered, as they encompass the temporal 
span in which the most significant legal innovations regarding 
environmental law occurred. The intention is to provide a detailed 
analysis of the development of Japanese environmental law. Specific 
attention will be paid to the cumulative effects of significant domestic 
events related to the environment and decisions from judges in major 
environmental law cases. 
A.  First Period 
The first period began with the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The 
prevailing thought during this time was that Japan could thwart 
potential colonizers by conveying strength in the form of industrial 
prowess.101 In order to spur the kind of economic growth deemed 
necessary to augment Japan’s status, the country focused on 
developing the heavy industry sector.102 As heavy industry grew, 
Japan began to experience the side effects of rapid development; the 
“consequences of . . . industrialization could already be seen in the 
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natural scenery.”103 Only twelve years after the Meiji Restoration 
commenced, Japan would endure its first serious environmental 
problem. It presented an early test of the competence of the legal 
system and the Diet, Japan’s bicameral legislature, to address the 
social and environmental impacts resulting from industrialization. 
The Ashio case, in which copper mining led to pollution of the 
Watarase River, demonstrated a concrete instance in which “extensive 
local environmental pollution and suffering became a social 
problem.”104 Heavy pollution caused by increased mining production 
manifested shocking visceral imagery, from dead fish floating along 
the river, to infant mortality.105 In 1896, the effects of mining at Ashio 
garnered national media coverage, which, along with peasant protests, 
ultimately forced the government to take decisive action.106 Although 
the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce articulated strict, 
unambiguous deadlines for “preventative construction” intended to 
dramatically reduce the sources of pollution in 1897, the government 
was only able to force mine managers to capitulate after much 
damage had already been done to both citizens and the 
environment.107 In its totality, the Ashio case offered two important 
insights regarding the capacity of Japan to effectively handle the 
environmental crises pervasive throughout the Meiji period: (1) The 
Diet proved impotent to regulate pollution and (2) “[t]he legal system 
played only a minor role . . . usually limited to the prosecution and 
defense of criminal charges.”108 Any hopes for improving the 
government’s ability to address Japan’s environmental problems were 
swiftly supplanted as the country shifted its focus to its military 
obligations in World War II. 
B.  Second Period 
With the onset of the war, Japan diverted its attention from the 
pollution problem, ushering in the second period of environmental 
regulatory activity on uncertain grounds. After the conclusion of 
World War II, Japan was subject to dramatic reforms to its 
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governmental and legal infrastructures during the ensuing American 
occupation.109 In particular, the Meiji Constitution was replaced by 
the Constitution of Japan of 1946. The new Constitution included two 
articles which could be utilized to demonstrate “a constitutional basis 
for claiming the right to a decent and healthy environment”—Article 
XIII, which guarantees the right to the pursuit of happiness, and 
Article XXV, which guarantees the right to maintain the minimum 
standards for wholesome and cultured living of the people.110 In 
theory, these articles could be used to bring a cause of action in cases 
of environmental harm; however, few endeavored to apply the 
relevant articles in such a manner. Early on in postwar Japan, it 
became apparent that the court system as it currently functioned was 
inadequate to deal with litigation arising from the high volume of 
people adversely affected by pollution.111 
Just as Japan was coming to terms with the fallibility of its legal 
institutions and their capacity for managing environmental litigation, 
the country fell back on its Meiji era drive for rapid industrialization, 
reigniting concerns over the impact that industrial growth might have 
on the environment and human health. Its national pride bruised from 
the Axis powers’ loss in World War II, Japan sought to restore morale 
through development of its industrial sector; the Japanese would 
obtain happiness and improve national welfare through material 
prosperity.112 
By 1955, the negative effects of the renewed emphasis on industry 
started to emerge. Three events related to industrialization occurred 
during the latter half of the 1950s, arousing public concern and 
magnifying the need for comprehensive environmental regulations. In 
1955, Minamata disease, a mysterious illness later found to be caused 
by mercury poisoning, was discovered.113 The pervasiveness and 
salience of the disease raised public consciousness about the potential 
consequences of the drive for industrialization.114 Three years later, 
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when runoff from a pulp factory owned by the Honshu Paper Mill 
Company began to harm local fisheries along the Edo River, 
fishermen demanded the company claim responsibility and offer 
compensation for damages to their livelihood.115 Upon the company’s 
failure to address the allegations, fishermen stormed the plant, 
resulting in a melee in which dozens “were injured, and over one 
thousand policemen had to be summoned to suppress the riot.”116 Due 
to its proximity to Tokyo, the skirmish attracted national attention, 
and organized demonstrations calling for effective water pollution 
laws followed soon after.117 As a result, two new water pollution laws 
passed the Diet with little controversy—the Water Quality 
Conservation Law and the Factory Effluent Regulation Law. 
However, the legislation furnished at the request of the public proved 
to be largely ineffective. Later, in 1959, as tensions mounted and 
patience for concerted governmental action to address the causes of 
Minamata disease wore thin, members of the Minamata Fisheries 
Cooperative launched a violent protest, “[breaking] into the Chisso 
plant and [causing] substantial damage.”118 With public outrage 
continuing on a persistently volatile path, both the government and 
Chisso resolved to settle the issue, albeit with only half-hearted 
conviction.119 Despite the government’s attempt at brokering a peace 
between business and the citizenry, Minamata disease would remain 
at the forefront of environmental concerns in Japan well into the 
1970s. 
In 1962, recognizing the insufficiency of existing legislation to 
adjudicate administrative cases, Japan augmented its legal system 
through the passage of the Administrative Case Litigation Law 
(ACLL).120 The ACLL provided a definition of standing (uttae no 
rieki) that has remained to this day the guiding source of legal 
doctrine on the issue. Article 9 of the ACLL requires that in order for 
an individual to challenge an administrative act in a judicial forum, 
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the individual must demonstrate the existence of a “legal interest.” 
More precisely, “plaintiffs must demonstrate possession of a right 
recognized by statute, in addition to proving a causal relation between 
the contested administrative action and the alleged adverse effect on 
legal interests.”121 
C.  Third Period 
The end of the second period and early portion of the third period 
in Japan’s history of modern environmental law saw a shift from an 
emphasis on restoring national pride through economic development 
to widespread concern regarding the ramifications of such a pursuit. 
The failings of the government to address pollution in an adequate 
and timely fashion prompted the Japanese citizenry to look to the 
courts for stronger solutions to environmental problems.122 The courts 
were receptive to the demands of a worried population, as evidenced 
by their willingness to take up environmental questions and fill the 
pollution policy void.123 The courts had located a newfound courage 
that would be exercised in the early 1970s. 
The third period truly began, however, with the passage of the 
Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control in 1967. The Basic 
Law, while essentially setting up a framework for the adoption of 
more specific environmental legislation, reflected the government’s 
acknowledgement of pollution as a serious issue, articulated the 
responsibility of the national government in helping local 
governments set up local control programs, and centralized the 
authority and administrative duties pertaining to pollution 
regulation.124 On the one hand, the legislation was unprecedented; it 
represented “the first comprehensive, nation-wide environmental 
pollution control law in Japan.”125 On the other hand, the government 
inserted a “harmony clause” that obfuscated the balance sought 
between human health and economic progress. The harmony clause 
effectively “meant that pollution controls should in no way harm 
industrial development.”126 
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One year later, the tension between centralized control and local 
regulation of pollution would be inflamed with the passage of the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Environmental Pollution Control Ordinance. The 
Tokyo Ordinance expanded the definition of pollution beyond the 
scope of the Basic Law, setting a major local precedent that 
challenged the narrower purview of the Basic Law. Specifically, the 
Tokyo Ordinance construed “environmental pollution to mean any 
infringement of the environment” and promulgated the notion that 
“citizens have the right to a clean and safe environment.”127 Such 
provisions stood in stark contrast to the relatively benign intentions 
laid forth in the Basic Law, sending the message to the national 
government that stronger language and legal obligations were desired. 
The year 1970 marked a pivotal moment in the history of Japanese 
environmental law. Referred to in the literature as Kōgai Gannen 
(First Year of the Era of Pollution), 1970 involved a confluence of 
important events that highlighted the ongoing struggle between the 
quest for industrialization and the preservation of a traditional way of 
life.128 Increasing pollution, greater media coverage of environmental 
harm caused by industrialization, mounting public fear of the health 
effects from pollution, growing criticism from local governments and 
the international community, and the potential for electoral losses due 
to poor handling of the pollution issue further pressed the government 
to take action. The embattled national government answered the call 
for reform and took several measures to address the pollution 
problem. First, the Basic Law was revised with a new purpose in 
mind—”to protect the health of the nation and to conserve the living 
environment.”129 Second, the Diet passed a pollution crime law 
making certain polluting activities subject to classification as criminal 
offenses. However, preventive measures were ultimately removed 
from the text “so that [the legislation] could be used only to punish 
polluters after they had already caused grievous damage to human 
life.”130 Finally, in 1971 the “Pollution Diet” established a national 
regulatory entity, the Environment Agency, to oversee administration 
of environmental issues and enforce environmental regulations.131 
Here, foreign influence played a key role in the development of 
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domestic environmental governance; Japan had studied the recent 
proliferation of independent environmental agencies throughout the 
West to better inform the creation of their own environmental 
agency.132 
Although the Japanese government had made efforts to address the 
deteriorating quality of the environment, pollution continued to be a 
serious issue, and environmental conditions did not improve quickly 
enough to avoid severe health impacts. The inability of the 
government to sufficiently manage the pollution crisis was seen in the 
swelling docket of the court system. From 1971 to 1973, the courts 
decided four important pollution cases that would alter the power 
dynamic of environmental regulation in Japan. Known collectively as 
the “big four,” each of these cases was decided in favor of the 
plaintiff who filed suit against a company or companies to seek 
damages for suffering caused by pollution.133 All of the cases were 
decided at the district court level, signifying a growing distance 
between lower courts and the Supreme Court. 
Despite the victories won by the plaintiffs in the big four, the legal 
process had shown itself to be critically sluggish (Minamata disease 
was first discovered in the mid-1950s) and the restrictive construal of 
standing doctrine limited popular access to the courts. This 
phenomenon could be explained by the fact that standing doctrine in 
Japan differentiates between “the legal interests of private 
individuals,” which warrant the granting of standing, and the interests 
“shared by the general public that may incidentally be adversely 
affected by an official act,” referred to as “reflex interests,” which are 
often not recognized as legal interests that merit standing.134 
However, there have been deviations from the orthodox doctrine that 
have signaled a willingness on the part of judges to engage in the 
creative expansion of standing rules in environmental cases. In 1972, 
the Tokyo High Court decided in the Nikko Tarō Cedar Tree case that 
“preservation of scenic, historical, and cultural sites of value should 
be given the utmost consideration by administrative agencies because 
they enhance the people’s ability to enjoy a healthy and cultural 
life.”135 
 
132 Id. at 26. 
133 The four cases were the Kumamoto Minamata Disease case, Niigata Minamata 
Disease case, Toyama Itai Itai Disease case, and Yokkaichi Asthma case. See Upham, 
supra note 108. 
134 Kawashima, supra note 103, at 263–64. 
135 Id. at 264. 
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D.  Synthesis 
As a civil law country, Japan’s judicial decisions are often 
instructed by or implicitly deferential to legal precedent; however, 
judges’ decisions do not make direct, purposive mention of previous 
court cases. Therefore, attempting to establish the degree to which 
standing doctrine in environmental law cases has been explicitly 
influenced by foreign legal precedent presents an empirical challenge. 
Further complicating matters, with regards to the decisions made in 
the big four pollution cases, “the judges who have been involved in 
these cases have not explained their motivations publicly.”136 In spite 
of empirical hurdles, one can arrive at a cautious approximation of the 
influential intensity of various factors through a brief examination of 
circumstantial evidence. 
At first blush, the degree to which Japan’s legal structure has been 
influenced by the United States in the domain of environmental law 
seems significant. Between the democratic reforms to Japan’s 
Constitution led by the United States during the Occupation, 
modeling of the Environment Agency after Western government 
agencies charged with administration of national environmental 
issues, and rough temporal congruence with the period in which the 
United States liberalized its standing doctrine, it remains a possibility 
that Japan was at least marginally influenced by the actions of other 
countries with progressive legal agendas in the domain of 
environmental law. 
However, the social, political, economic, and environmental 
context of late twentieth century Japan ultimately offers a more 
suggestive explanation for the enhanced justiciability of 
environmental cases. First, the steady stream of pollution related 
cases in lower and higher courts since the 1960s continues to exert 
pressure on the Japanese government to address environmental 
concerns. Second, the intensity of media coverage of the harmful 
effects of pollution elevated public consciousness about the social 
costs of industrialization, regularly castigating the government for its 
inability to combat pollution. Third, violent protests launched to 
demand greater governmental and industrial accountability tarnished 
Japan’s authority on the domestic front and corroded the image of a 
recovering industrial power at the international level. Ever image 
 
136 Upham, supra note 108, at 606. 
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conscious in the postwar era, Japan did not want to generate the 
appearance of a burgeoning legitimacy crisis. 
Fourth, although no firsthand accounts of judicial decision-making 
were available at the time of writing, scholarly commentary on the 
mentality of judges, specifically those judges involved in the big four 
pollution cases, offers a useful supplementary perspective. In 
Upham’s interpretive analysis of the big four cases, he paints the 
judges as moderately activist, empathetic, socially conscious 
interpreters of the law. He surmises that “there is no question that 
each judge was quite conscious of the difficulties that the traditional 
theories [of causation] would present to the plaintiffs and were 
determined to shape standards of proof that would minimize those 
difficulties to the greatest extent possible.”137 “[I]t is easy to imagine 
the judges viewing themselves as the last chance for the vindication 
of substantive justice.”138 
Perhaps similarities in the way in which the United States and 
Japan have dealt with environmental issues through their respective 
legal systems “result primarily not from economic competition 
between governments or from emulation, but from common responses 
by governments to similar economic, political and social 
conditions.”139 Particularly in the case of Japan, the development of 
legal doctrine similar to the United States’ legal doctrine at the time 
can be reasonably understood in terms of two democratic countries 
generating similar responses to common problems. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
As noted in the introduction, the United States, India, and Japan 
each experienced significant judicial innovations during the latter half 
of the twentieth century that profoundly impacted the ability of 
citizens to redress environmental grievances (see Figure 1 below). 
 
137 Id. at 609. 
138 Id. at 610. 
139 R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese Law, 23 U. 
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environmental degradation through innovative interpretation of 
standing doctrine. Attempts to revise the U.S. Constitution to protect 
environmental rights would only come after Scenic Hudson, and all 
such efforts have proven unsuccessful thus far.140 In India, in the 
wake of the extensive damage and human suffering caused by the 
Bhopal disaster, the Supreme Court took the lead by interpreting the 
Constitution’s right to life clause to include the right to a safe 
environment. The Supreme Court of India reacted to public concern, 
bypassing an ineffective lower court system and a corrupt 
bureaucracy to offer a more efficient avenue for the pursuit of 
environmental justice. In Japan, well-intentioned but under-enforced 
environmental statutes at the federal level left citizens with little 
recourse to redress environmental grievances until district courts 
found in favor of the claimants in each of the big four pollution cases. 
Standing doctrine continued to be construed narrowly, and the 
Supreme Court proved unwilling to carry the torch of creative judicial 
interpretation that might assist individuals in bringing their 
environmental claims to trial. The lower courts, conscious of the 
plight of Japanese to obtain compensation for environmental wrongs 
committed in the name of industrialization, served as hospitable 
venues for the administration of justice. In each of these cases the 
globalized phenomenon of industrialization caused real or potential 
environmental harms for which individuals sought redress. Yet the 
avenue through which justice was obtained was specific to the state in 
question, depending on the efficacy and efficiency of various 
domestic institutions. The question of how the right institution is 
finally selected, perhaps through trial and error or conscious venue 
shopping, remains yet unresolved but is an area worthy of further 
exploration. 
Second, the empirical evidence in this study suggests that, 
whatever mechanism of influence may be at play, states have 
similarly endeavored to challenge the conventional interpretations of 
legal doctrine in order to have environmental wrongs addressed by the 
courts. I suggest that this trend may be the result of international 
environmental norms and principles that have diffused 
transnationally. In the cases described here, the international 
environmental norm may be that individuals and groups of affected 
 
140 See Richard O. Brooks, A Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment, 16 VT. 
L. REV. 1063, 1068–70 (1992) (discussing failed attempts to reform the U.S. Constitution 
with regards to codifying environmental rights). 
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individuals have legitimate legal claims when they suffer (or may 
potentially suffer) from man-made environmental damage. The 
broader concept entailed here may be that people possess certain 
environmental rights which, when infringed upon, give rise to legal 
claims that require adjudication by courts. The cases analyzed in this 
paper offer some initial support for identifying the presence of an 
international norm of environmental rights, the existence of which is 
temporally corroborated by legal scholars who largely consider this 
regime to have formally emerged with the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment.141 
Future research on the development of environmental rights in state 
legal systems should seek to discern those factors that contributed to 
judicial decision making in landmark decisions and assess which 
theoretical framework provides the most purchase in terms of 
explaining changes in legal norms in the area of environmental rights. 
The application of compelling theoretical explanations for the 
phenomenon described in this paper and the explication of potentially 
valid causal mechanisms require further scholarship, perhaps drawing 
from resources in cognate disciplines. In the interim, this paper offers 
a starting point for such scholarship by recognizing that while states 
have experienced similar problems in managing the environmental 
consequences of economic development, their respective legal 
systems have similarly responded to public concern through 
innovation and leadership. 
  
 
141 See W. Paul Gormley, The Legal Obligation of the International Community to 
Guarantee a Pure and Decent Environment: The Expansion of Human Rights Norms, 3 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 85 (1990); James R. May, Constituting Fundamental 
Environmental Rights Worldwide, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 113 (2005); Neil A.F. 
Popović, Pursuing Environmental Justice with International Human Rights and State 
Constitutions, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 338 (1996); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, 
Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 103 (1991). 
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